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European employers are rediscovering liberalised labour migration and are attempting to lobby
governments to modify previously restrictive regulatory approaches. This article analyses these
newly embraced interest positions, drawing on empirical evidence from the United Kingdom and
Germany. Employers do not simply desire more migrants or are indifferent to their skills profile, but
rather seek newcomers who can be easily accommodated and complement existing corporate
strategies and skills requirements. However, they may also seek to ‘import’ missing skills that
domestic educational facilities do not generate. The profile of ‘desirable’ economic migrants varies
and is conditioned by production strategies and education and training schemes associated with
different varieties of capitalism. This article proposes bridging the gap between comparative political
economy and migration studies.
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1. Introduction: The Voice of Employer Associations
Over the past 15 years, European governments have rediscovered labour migration.
The restrictive approaches that dominated the period between the mid-1970s and
the mid-1990s have given way to more liberal policy design regarding ‘desirable’
labour migrants, though not other categories of migrants. Current debates in
political science migration studies explore a number of agents active in migration
policy-making, including ‘organised interest groups, courts, ethnic groups, trade
unions, law and order bureaucracies, police and security agencies, local actors and
street-level bureaucrats and private actors’ (Lahav and Guiraudon 2006, 207).
This article contributes to this debate by exploring the political activities of
employer associations, actors that have remained largely bereft of scholarly atten-
tion. Adopting a perspective that is both influenced by the comparative capitalisms
approach in comparative political economy and previous work on the role of
organised interest groups in migration studies (Freeman 1995, 2002 and 2006), it is
argued that the advocacy positions of employer associations are shaped by the
particularities of the national production systems they are embedded in. In other
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words, the aim of the article is not to demonstrate a causal role of employer
associations in shaping migration policy, but rather to highlight the crucial effect
that models of capitalism have on employer preferences regarding the profile of
‘desirable’ labour migrants. This is operationalised in terms of Peter Hall and David
Soskice’s (2001) two ideal-types of varieties of capitalism (VoC). In methodological
terms, the article adopts the case study method, by focusing on the two European
case studies best representing these ideal-types, Germany and the United Kingdom.
Empirically, it focuses on the analysis of labour migration policy design between
1995 and the present. Although the current recession has tempered calls for fresh
labour migration somewhat, the preference formation of employers as such is
obviously not affected by the economic downturn. The rest of this article is orga-
nised as follows.
In the second section, the theoretical contribution is outlined, drawing on both the
migration and comparative political economy literature. The main proposition is
presented in more detail, according to which employer preferences for labour
migrants are influenced by models of capitalism. Employers will want migrants to
complement and not complicate existing production strategies and expect them to
fit easily with skills and training strategies.
In the third and empirical section, the influence of employers in shaping public
policy is explored. Finally, a conclusion succinctly summarises the insights derived
from the analysis of previously neglected actors in migration policy-making and
advocates applying tenets of comparative political economy to studying migration.
2. Models of Capitalism, Employer Associations and
Labour Migration Policies
European migration policies are rapidly changing. A formerly restrictive approach,
assumed after the end of the post-war boom in the early 1970s, has been slowly
abandoned in favour of more pragmatic and liberal labour migration policy. Not-
withstanding the impediments to resuming labour recruitment (Messina 1990) and
the obvious shortcomings of the guest-worker concept of the post-war decades,
European governments from Ireland to Italy, from France to the Czech Republic
have commenced recruiting economic migrants again. In some countries, EU east-
ward enlargement in 2004 was perceived and used as an additional channel for
labour migration, while elsewhere fears over ‘social dumping’ led to temporary
bans on labour recruitment from the new member states. These different responses
highlight that the opportunity for recruiting what was perceived as primarily
low-skill migration was welcomed in settings open to low-skill migration, but
rejected in countries in which that was not the case.
But who drives these changes? A ‘gap’ between restrictionist rhetoric and slightly
more permissive practice (Hansen 2002) exists. It has previously been partially
accounted for by the activities of liberal courts (Hollifield 1992; Joppke 1998;
Guiraudon 2000 and 2001), though these pertain predominantly to humanitarian
forms of migration, especially family reunion, but also asylum seekers and refugees.
Other relevant actors recently addressed in the migration literature include political
parties (Bale 2008), the media (Demo 2004) and trade unions (Haus 2002; Watts
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2002). Nevertheless, ‘prevailing scholarship ... has been inconclusive with regard to
the role and nature of domestic actors on national immigration policy-making’
(Lahav and Guiraudon 2006, 207).
Obviously, not all of these actors have a stake in labour migration policy. Little
scholarly attention has been paid to the role of employer associations in migration
studies (exceptions are Caviedes 2006; Menz 2008; Cerna 2009), though organised
business played a pivotal role in earlier Marxist-inspired analytical contributions
(Cole and Dale 1999; earlier: Castles and Kosack 1973; Castells 1975; Piore 1979).
This is surprising, for it would seem prima facie fruitful to explore the role of these
actors in understanding how and why national-level labour migration policy has
come to be liberalised across Europe since the mid-1990s. While the ‘gap’ puzzle is
still unresolved, it is worth noting that with respect to labour migrants, official
discourse is strikingly less restrictive regarding ‘undesirable’ migrant groups. The
framework proposed addresses the interest positions assumed by employers since
the mid-1990s.
One of the most valuable endeavours towards exploring the role of interest groups
and explaining the puzzle of expansionary policies behind a backdrop of restrictive
public sentiment is Gary Freeman’s pioneering work (1995, 2002 and 2006).
Inspired by James Wilson (1980), it has emphasised the importance of client politics
in liberal democracies, though principally the United States, where well-organised
business groups and ethnic advocacy coalitions combine efforts to press for liberal
policies from which they benefit and whose costs are diffused. For labour-oriented
non-permanent migration both costs and benefits are concentrated (Freeman 2006,
230), leading to ‘interest group politics’, while for permanent migration channels
the benefits are concentrated and the costs are often diffuse, which leads to a
low-conflict mode of client politics. With costs diffuse in the latter case, opponents
to immigration may find it difficult to organise and rally effectively. In the former
case, we would expect organised labour to be a natural opponent of immigration
(cf. Freeman 2006, 233–234), yet research on recent European trade union posi-
tions suggests that carefully managed labour immigration is preferred to a restric-
tive approach and substantial unregulated migration (Haus 2002; Watts 2002).
Although compelling in its empirical application and rightfully applauded for its
introduction of a political economy angle, Freeman’s work has been criticised for
not being applicable to the European context, where ethnic advocacy groups thus
far play a limited role and so ‘client politics’ play out quite differently (Joppke 1999;
but see Freeman 2006, 234–235). Immigration is also framed and perceived differ-
ently by actors (Statham and Geddes 2006) in countries that for decades have
described themselves as not open to immigrants (Hansen 2002).
Modifying Freeman’s analysis somewhat, it is maintained that in the European
context employers will not simply lobby for ‘more liberal’ policy, but rather for
migrants with certain skill profiles which correspond to the predominant produc-
tion strategy in a given country. Employers do not univocally advocate the recruit-
ment of identical profiles of economic migrants. Their interest will be conditioned
by the model of capitalism (and thus the production strategy) they are embedded
in, ensuring complementarity.1 Skills are a crucial factor in such considerations. For
the sake of parsimony, it is assumed that skill sets of migrants differ along two
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dimensions, the level (low versus highly skilled) and the specificity (sector-specific
versus generalist) (see Table 1).2 Sector-specific skills are those linked to one specific
sector of the economy, either acquired through applied tertiary education or post-
secondary vocational training. Generalist skills are defined as not specific to one
particular economic sector and transferable. While John Salt (1997, 5) defined
highly skilled as ‘tertiary level education or its equivalent in experience’, I use the
term in a somewhat broader sense to encompass graduates of post-secondary
vocational training schemes. Consequently, unskilled or low skilled are those who
do not possess such formal qualifications. It is true that ‘countries’ policies cannot
thus be deducted from a simple division into ... VoC groups’ (Cerna 2009, 146).
However, the advocacy position of employers is indeed shaped by the production
system and the respective model of capitalism, that is, either a liberal market
economy (LME) or a co-ordinated market economy (CME).
The training systems of CMEs typically provide high skill levels and the
requisite mix of company-specific and more general technical skills ... [by
contrast] support for the development of general skills in LMEs may make
the production of goods and services that require less skilled but lower
cost labor more viable there (Hall and Soskice 2001, 40–44).
Consequently, the case selection encompasses Germany and the United Kingdom,
countries that are considered paradigmatic cases of CMEs and LMEs, respectively.3
Employers may also use labour migration to escape confines imposed by training
systems. LME employers may encounter skill shortages among the domestic labour
pool due to the traditional weakness of LME education systems in generating
vocational training schemes. CME employers face a different challenge: in certain
sectors, especially those rapidly evolving due to technological change, CME edu-
cation and training systems may perform inadequately, because they are geared
towards gradual, not radical, product innovation. ‘Importing labour’ to overcome or
‘circumvent institutional constraints’ is recognised as an explicit business strategy in
recent VoC literature (Herrmann 2009). Employers will thus seek to secure employ-
ees with skills that are complementary in the first instance, creating obvious synergy
Table 1: Interest Positions of Employers in Liberal and Co-ordinated
Market Economies
Skill level  Unskilled/low skilled Highly skilled
Skill specificity 
LME employer interest (synergy) LME employer interest
(supplementarity)
Sector-specific No CME employer interest
(synergy)
CME employer interest
Generalist LME employer interest (synergy) LME employer interest
(synergy)
No CME employer interest CME employer interest
(supplementarity)
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effects, but they will also turn to labour migration as a source of supplementarity to
overcome limitations of domestic training systems.
In LMEs, there is generally more generalist and employer-specific and on-the-job
training provided (Thelen 2004) as opposed to sector-specific skills, hence migrants
with a variety of past training and skill levels can be accommodated. ‘Individuals
and employers are free to determine levels and types of skill investment and
acquisition’ (Keep and Mayhew 1997, 372). Thus, employers in LMEs will welcome
migrants with general skill profiles and both low- and high-skilled labour migrants.
There is a substantial service sector in the UK, accounting for 75 per cent of total
employment in 2003, according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) (Hall 2007, 67), some of which is based on ‘a lower-cost,
lower-price strategy, underpinning service-sector expansion’ (Hancké et al. 2007,
32–33). Here, high staff fluctuation and quickly shifting labour demand are impor-
tant factors in influencing employer demands, not least because low-skill low-wage
jobs are inherently difficult to recruit for due to these said low wages, low prestige
and unappealing working conditions, as Michael Piore’s dual labour market thesis
(1979, 17) highlighted.
Employers in CMEs will lobby for skilled migrants who either complement existing
production modes directly or provide valuable synergies if they permit the ‘import’
of skills that are not or not sufficiently generated domestically, thus permitting
radical product innovation. Highly skilled foreigners may have skills equivalent to
CME-style vocational training, though this is difficult to emulate abroad, or tertiary
education; they may thus either possess generalist or specific skills. However, there
is no interest in unskilled migrants. The absence of a sizeable low-skill low-wage
service sector renders low-skilled or unskilled individuals difficult to employ.
Employers have no institutional incentive to upset the ‘high-skill equilibrium’
(Culpepper 1999; Culpepper and Finegold 2001), which is a crucial component of
the CME model, but face potentially very costly consequences for doing so.
Therefore, the embedded environments of LMEs and CMEs shape the preferences
of actors and create demands for different sets of labour migrants. Different national
production strategies influence employer advocacy coalitions. Recent trends
towards economic liberalisation notwithstanding, the differences in production
strategies are more pivotal in the present than they were during the post-war phase
of labour recruitment. Furthermore, post-war labour migration was not exclusively
driven by economic factors such as skill profiles and labour shortages and often
more influenced by (post-)colonial ties (Castles and Miller 2003).
The main contention is that employer preferences are shaped by the system of political
economy (or variety of capitalism) they are embedded in.
LME employers will make demands for migrants with both generalist and sector-
specific skills, and both highly skilled and low skilled. Such labour migrants can be
easily accommodated into flexibility-oriented production strategies and comple-
ment existing training schemes or provide a useful synergy by ‘importing’ skilled
labour. CME employers will be interested in migrants with high skills, either of a
generalist nature or sector-specific. There will be no interest in the unskilled.
The article bridges the gap between the migration literature and the rapidly evolv-
ing scholarship on comparative political economy, ‘mainstreaming’ migration by
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marrying it with fresh insights from a different subfield. In doing so, the weakness
of the political science literature on European migration in treating the field as a sui
generis subfield is addressed. Freeman (2006) refers to this as a tendency to con-
struct idiosyncratic national models. In a recent contribution, Freeman and Kessler
(2008, 668) bemoan that ‘neither the “varieties of capitalism” literature nor
welfare-state typologies have systematically considered the implications of their
models for responses of firms or states to international migration’. This article helps
demonstrate pathways towards addressing this lacuna. Similarly, the commonly
state-centric bias is addressed by focusing on somewhat under-researched non-state
actors, namely employer associations.
Recent advances in comparative political economy have stressed the resilience of
national models or varieties of capitalism (Coates 2000; Hall and Soskice 2001;
Amable 2003; Hancké et al. 2007). This highly influential, though also criticised
(Coates 2005) approach highlights the persistence of multiple equilibria in the
institutional configuration of systems of political-economic governance, encom-
passing systems of industrial relations and labour market regulation, vocational
training and education, corporate governance and finance and intra-firm relation-
ships. For all its strengths, it is a very theoretical body of literature and can be
strengthened by further empirical applications, especially in a field such as labour
migration, which is logically linked to many of the core components of these
varieties. However, this link has not been previously explored in the literature. It is
explicitly acknowledged that as a qualitative study of the emergence of interest
positions, based on interpretative comparative research in a politically extremely
sensitive policy domain, the goal of this article is to demonstrate linkages heuris-
tically, rather than decisively ‘proving’ causal influence beyond reasonable doubt.
The aim of the article is also not to demonstrate a causal role of employer associa-
tions in shaping migration policy, but rather to highlight the effect that models of
capitalism have on employer preferences. The following two sections examine
empirically the role of the different systems of political economy influencing
employer preferences and, in many cases, indirectly shaping governmental policy in
Germany and the United Kingdom.
3. The Politics of Advocating Liberalised Labour
Migration Policy
Developments in Germany
Notwithstanding recent transformations (Streeck and Höpner 2003; Streeck and
Hassel 2004), the German political economy is regarded as the paradigmatic CME in
the VoC literature. Employers, organised in the Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen
Arbeitgeberverbaende [Federal Association of German Employer Associations]
(BDA) and for larger internationally oriented companies also the interest group
Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie [Federal Association of German Industry]
(BDI), are interested in maintaining and enhancing institutions that provide public
goods, notably training and education (Hall and Gingerich 2004).
By the mid-1990s, German employers were discovering labour migration. This
originated within the BDI and can be traced to its outspoken late 1990s president,
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Hans-Olaf Henkel. Henkel called for more avenues for legal labour migration in a
general quest to render Germany’s economy more dynamic and competitive.4 The
BDA slowly embraced this stance. The employers saw the liberalisation of labour
migration both as a useful tool in securing greater competitiveness and as a mecha-
nism for addressing alleged shortages of highly skilled employees, emphasised
particularly by the largest and most powerful sectoral employer Gesamtmetall.
Henkel himself was part of two government expert commissions on immigration
and harshly criticised the Christian Democrats’ rejection of labour migration quotas
(Manager Magazin, 16 October 2000). The two centre-right parties feared that such
quotas would promote excessive immigration levels. In the course of regional
elections in the state of North Rhine Westphalia in 2000, the Christian Democrat
candidate Jürgen Rüttgers questioned the necessity of soliciting labour migration
altogether, calling instead for more investment in domestic training and education
(Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 8 March 2000). Henkel’s successor, Michael
Rogowski, rejected any quantitative limits to quotas. Alternatively, he proposed
setting them at 300,000 annually, a tenfold increase over the quota proposed by the
2001 commission (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11 June 2001). These quotas would have
been geared exclusively towards highly skilled migrants. The BDA enthusiastically
welcomed the ‘new paradigmatic change’ inherent in the hotly contested 2002
draft bill which contained a liberalisation of labour migration, claiming to have
demanded such change ‘for a long time’ (BDA 2002; interview, BDA). Convinced
of the necessity to ‘compete for the best brains’ and ‘internationally mobile high
flyers’ to address ‘labour market shortages’ and to ensure the continued ‘competi-
tiveness of Germany as a place to do business’, regulation concerning economic
migration needs to be liberalised, permitting both temporary and long-term migra-
tion flows, with minimal discretion for local and regional administrative interven-
tions, ‘while more stringent procedures and increased deportations should render
asylum less attractive’ (BDA 2002); with the latter presumably rendering the
former more palatable to the electorate.
Not content with voicing their demands for liberalised labour migration policy
through the expert committees, the employers also launched a vociferous and
financially well-endowed public relations vehicle to popularise their demands for a
general liberalisation of the economy, including migration. Founded in 2000 by
Gesamtmetall, the New Social Market Economy Initiative aims to influence public
opinion and lobby decision-makers directly (Leif 2004), drawing on an annual
budget of €10 million. Immigration of ‘highly qualified foreigners’ is one of its many
proposals based on the ‘know how’ and ‘contribution to economic growth’ and ‘the
future’ that skilled migrants make (Initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft 2002, 8,
2004 and 2006).
These lobbying activities started bearing fruits in the 2000s. In 2000, the Red–Green
government launched a temporary labour recruitment programme for 20,000
highly skilled migrants, particularly in information technology (the so-called ‘green
card’ initiative). The following year, Minister for the Interior Schily commissioned
a report from an expert commission composed of academics, legal experts, social
partners and politicians from all parties, headed by moderate Christian Democrat
Süssmuth (Unabhängige Kommission 2001). Despite the fervent support of the
representatives of the employers in the commission, Schily was unwilling to heed
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the call for annual migration quotas. This was in part a strategic decision, as the
Christian Democrats had made their reservations concerning anything resembling
quotas very clear. The law was finally accepted by the Bundestag on 1 July and by
the Bundesrat on 9 July 2004, entitled ‘Law on the management and limitation of
inward migration and the regulation of the residence and integration of EU citizens
and foreigners’, and came into effect as of 1 January 2005 (BGBl Part I no. 41 1950
of 5 August 2004).
The employer association had been consulted throughout the drafting of the bill
(interviews, BDA; MinInt). Both BDA representatives within the commission
strongly lobbied in favour of more ‘demand-oriented managed migration’ and less
bureaucratic leeway for regional labour market administrations in the context of
more ‘competition for the best brains’, coupled with faster asylum decisions and
more rigorously enforced deportations to ‘avoid any signal that could be under-
stood in countries of origin that immigration for non-labour market related reasons
will be expanded’ (BDA 2002). Employers were particularly interested in highly
skilled migrants, not least due to the positive experiences with the ‘green card’
programme, and contributed to the demand for an annual migration quota, based
on a points system (interview, BDA). Consistent lobbying led to the creation of
migration channels for highly skilled high-wage professionals in the new immigra-
tion bill. Entrepreneurs investing at least €1 million and creating at least 10 new
jobs and carefully delineated categories of highly skilled migrants were permitted
access, including teachers, scientists and skilled managers earning in excess of
€100,000 (all defined in Art. 19). In addition, foreign graduates of German univer-
sities were permitted to remain in the country for one additional year to search for
employment. By contrast, no specific categories were created for graduates of
foreign vocational training schemes or low-skilled employees. These legislative
measures reflected the preferences of employers for highly skilled labour migrants.
In 2007 and 2008, business-friendly reforms to German immigration legislation
continued. Vice-Chancellor and Minister of Labour Müntefering announced that
there was no need for low-skill labour migration, echoing the position of BDA. The
employers enthusiastically welcomed this liberalisation, emphasising labour short-
ages not only in engineering, but also in banking and business services (BDA
2007a), and continued their advocacy of the ‘long overdue introduction’ of such a
points-based system (BDA 2007b), pointing to Britain as a possible model (BDA
2007c and 2007d).
The Ministry of Labour drafted a bill on the ‘management of the migration of the
highly qualified’ during the summer of 2008. The key changes entailed were:
further reducing the annual income required for highly qualified migrants eligible
for ‘fast-tracking’ from €86,400 to €65,500; permitting labour market access for
university graduates from the EU-8 accession countries; and creating a permanent
council advising and evaluating labour market needs for skilled employees which
would include a representative of the employers. It also facilitated labour market
access for already resident temporarily ‘tolerated’ refugees if they could demon-
strate successful completion of a three-year tertiary training programme. The bill
was accepted by the Bundestag on 17 November and by the Bundesrat on 19
December 2008. It was warmly welcomed by the employers (BDA 2008).
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BDA began to embrace the idea of liberalised labour migration following the
impetus from BDI, but very quickly became an outspoken advocate in its own right.
In doing so, it was aided by the mighty sectoral metal sector association Gesamt-
metall (interviews, BDA; Gesamtmetall). Both associations claimed that shortages
among highly skilled employees, presumably key to high value added CME pro-
duction, were surfacing. Studies by the employer-friendly think tank Institute for
Economic Research claimed that in 2006, 48,000 engineer positions could not be
filled and 165,000 vacancies remained unfilled, resulting in a total loss for the
economy of €18.5 billion (Koppel 2007 and 2008). Given the ideological leanings of
this think tank, the accuracy of such claims might be contested, but they highlight
the close connection between skill levels and preferences with respect to migration
policy. There was no serious internal disagreement regarding the new liberal stance.
In fact, even a sectoral employer association of which one might have intuitively
expected advocacy for low-skilled migration, the association for gastronomy, did
not pursue such action (interview, DEHOGA). Its main point of criticism of the 2008
legislation is thus not the exclusive focus on highly skilled migrants, but rather the
focus on academic degrees as a measure of such skills, which in the hotel sector in
particular is often somewhat inadequate (DEHOGA 2008).
Thus, internal dissent was non-existent, though certain sectoral associations,
notably Gesamtmetall, were more enthusiastic than others, creating internal con-
sensus and a common external front among the German employers (interviews,
BDA; Gesamtmetall).
Developments in the United Kingdom
The British system of political economy is generally regarded as the primary Euro-
pean example of a liberal market economy (Hall and Soskice 2001, 8). In LMEs,
‘labour markets are fluid, workers have incentives to invest in general skills that can
be taken to other jobs, and, because industry associations are weak, firms lack the
capacity to mount the collaborative training programs that confer industry-specific
skills’ (Hall and Gingerich 2004, 9). This means not only greater wage dispersion,
but also incentives for companies to delay the introduction of new technology in
favour of relying on low-skill and low-wage labour. The decline of apprenticeship
and common training schemes further encourages labour ‘poaching’, which in turn
can appear preferable to costly in-house training. Such incentive structure has
important implications for human resource strategies, including a willingness to
rely on ‘imported’ skilled labour.
By the mid-1990s, British employers became concerned about labour shortages in
a variety of economic sectors and both in high- and low-skill positions (CBI 2005).
Consequently, they commenced actively advocating immigration considered to be
of economic utility (interview, CBI). Employers are ideationally unified and present
a common position. There are no real inter-sectoral differences, as an interest in
economic migrants pervades all sectoral associations (interviews, CBI; BHA).
The flexibility, additional skill base, often superior training and educational stan-
dards and soft skills such as higher motivation associated with economic migrants
are factors leading British employers to embrace liberalised labour migration and
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strongly lobby in its favour. A Confederation of British Industry (CBI) representa-
tive asserted in an interview that both highly skilled and low-skilled and both
generalist and sector-specific skills were welcomed (interview, CBI). In mid-2005
CBI president Digby Jones stressed the advantage Britain enjoyed thanks to its
flexible labour markets and pragmatic labour migration schemes, having earlier
proclaimed that ‘capital can’t afford to be racist for lots of reasons’ (BBC 2005). In
a 5 January 2006 policy statement (CBI 2006, 1), the CBI reaffirmed this position,
announcing:
The CBI believes that migration is beneficial to the UK. Migrants have
made an important contribution to the UK economy—bringing valuable
and scarce skills that have benefited UK business and helped contribute to
economic growth. Migrant workers are an integral part of the UK work-
force and the CBI shares the Government’s belief that a carefully managed
migration policy can bring further benefits to the UK.
The changing stance of the employers found a reflection in increasing willingness
on the part of policy-makers to designate new categories or reinvigorate existing
ones for labour migrants (Balch 2009). Tony Blair’s New Labour government
pursued a business-friendly and liberal stance towards migration, deliberately
setting itself apart from its Conservative predecessor. Indicative of the new govern-
mental approach was a 1998 White Paper entitled Our Competitive Future: Building the
Knowledge-Driven Economy by the Department for Trade and Industry, questioning
restrictive policy towards highly skilled migrants and entrepreneurs. The skill range
covered by the work permit scheme was broadened beginning in 2000; at the same
time formal requirements were relaxed to possession of a tertiary degree rather
than a degree and work experience. Consequently, the numbers of work permit
holders rose from 62,975 in 1997 to 137,035 in 2005. That same year, an ‘Inno-
vator’s Scheme’ was piloted, supported by Minister of Immigration Roche who
declared in a speech on 11 September 2000 that the ‘UK was in competition for the
brightest and best talents—the entrepreneurs, the scientists, the high technology
specialists who make the economy tick’ (Sommerville 2007, 30–31). The December
2001 Highly Skilled Migrants Programme (HSMP) first introduced an explicit points
system, taking into consideration formal level of education, work experience, salary
level, overall qualification and qualification of spouse. Additional points were
added for applicants in sectors with shortages—especially medicine—and, unlike
the previous procedure, applicants themselves filed the application rather than
their employer.
This rhetorical link between liberalised migration and enhanced competitiveness
was to be found not only in employer pronouncements, but also in government
circles. The Home Office’s 2002 ‘Secure Borders, Safe Havens’ contained a passage
about globalisation, arguing that on balance the UK stood to benefit, given that
‘our strong labour market acts as a magnet for those seeking better jobs for
themselves’ (Home Office 2002, para. 1.13). This theme similarly surfaces in an
April 2004 speech by Prime Minister Tony Blair at the CBI, which includes a plea
for ‘recognition of the benefits that controlled migration brings not just to the
economy but to delivering the public and private services on which we rely’
(Blair 2004, 6).
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The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act of 2002 implemented most of the
measures contained in the White Paper. Responsibility for work permits was moved
to the Home Office in 2001, where the old Overseas Labour Service (OLS) was
‘re-branded’ as ‘Work Permits UK’. The main thrust of the reforms was to restruc-
ture and ultimately limit the schemes pertaining to low-skill migration, based on
the strategy that central and eastern Europeans would fill these jobs from 2004
onwards, while streamlining procedures for high-skill migrants into a points-based
system, reflecting qualifications and labour market needs. Thus, the agricultural
working scheme was reduced in size in 2004. The working holidaymakers scheme
was first broadened in scope in 2003 to make greater allowances for New Com-
monwealth countries for foreign policy reasons, only to be quantitatively limited
again in February 2005. In 2003, an explicit quota scheme (‘sectors-based scheme’,
Immigration Rules HC 395, paras 135I–135 K; Ensor and Shah 2005) was intro-
duced for low-skill short-term migration, especially in gastronomy and food pro-
cessing, but phased out in 2006, based on the expectation that unimpeded labour
market access for EU-8 citizens would serve as a labour supply pool for low-skill
jobs. This proved a successful strategy: between May 2004 and December 2006
alone, 579,000 EU-8 citizens registered with the Department of Works and Pen-
sions, 65 per cent of whom were Polish (Sommerville 2007, 34).
The HSMP was replaced in 2008 by a new points-based system with two tiers for
‘highly skilled’ and ‘skilled’ migrants, respectively, also taking into account available
funds and past UK residence or educational experience (The Guardian, 30 October
2007). This marks somewhat of a change from the original policy proposal, but its
logic remains similar to that apparent in the proposal’s title, ‘A Points-Based
System: Making Migration Work for Britain’, namely being a ‘flexible, employer-
led’ logic (Home Office 2005, 9). The original plan would have replaced all of these
schemes with a single, points-based labour migration system, comprising four tiers,
three of which will be described below. The first one would have been reserved for
highly skilled professionals in fields such as IT, finance, medicine and engineering,
as well as ‘entrepreneurs’. The second category would have been geared towards
applicants in sectors experiencing shortages that cannot be filled domestically or
within the EU, especially in nursing and teaching. The third tier would have
consisted of short-term, tightly quantitatively limited quota schemes that can be
opened—and presumably closed—at short notice, replacing the agricultural and
sector-based schemes. The document reiterates on 12 occasions that employers will
be consulted or that the scheme is employer led. Some independent advisory bodies
on skills will also be consulted. The UK points-based scheme is a paradigmatic
example of business-driven labour recruitment schemes. While the 2010 Liberal
Democrat–Conservative coalition government announced plans to reduce the
numbers of non-EU highly skilled migrants immediately after coming to office in
July 2010, internal dissent has already surfaced, with outspoken Liberal Democrat
Business Secretary Cable criticising such a cap as ‘damaging’ (The Independent, 18
September 2010), suggesting an eventual compromise outcome.
British employers developed an interest in immigrants considered to be of economic
utility, both in very highly skilled service sector jobs, especially finance, law, health
and natural science research, and in low-skill jobs in food processing, agriculture,
gastronomy and construction, and both regarding generalist and sector-specific
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skills (interviews, CBI; BHA). While an official publication (CBI 2005, 2) highlights
that immigration ‘is no alternative to raising the skills levels of the home-grown
workforce—nor should immigration be seen as negating the need for effective
active labour market policies to tackle the problem of economic inactivity’, the same
position paper concedes that ‘20% of the UK workforce lack appropriate levels of
functional numeracy and literacy—raising the skill levels of this group would help
to ease recruitment difficulties faced by employers’ (CBI 2005, 2). In an interview,
a CBI representative confirmed sectoral and firm concerns over poor ‘employabil-
ity’ of domestic workers in some sectors and highlighted the advantages of hiring
‘better trained’ graduates of ‘continental vocational training schemes’ and univer-
sities, despite their marginally higher average age (interview, CBI). In 2005, CBI
together with the Trades Union Congress (TUC) and the Home Office published a
joint position paper, emphasising that ‘the skills and enthusiasm’ (TUC 2005, 1) of
new migrants was welcomed by all parties.
Along with the unions and certain NGOs, the CBI is invited to the biannual ‘user
panel’ planning sessions of the Immigration and Nationality Directorate in the
Home Office. Its representatives are also part of the employer taskforce group,
which is responsible for providing policy suggestions to the Home Office’s Border
and Immigration Agency. Recommendations from this group have fed into the
establishment of an Australian-style high-skill migration programme in February
2008 and the illegal working stakeholder group (interview, CBI). Within this
taskforce group, along with a trade union delegate, major internationally oriented
businesses such as Shell, Ernst & Young, Tesco, Citigroup and Goldman Sachs are
represented as well as sectoral employer associations in engineering, hospitality and
employment services, alongside NASSCOM, the Indian IT sector chamber of com-
merce. Both formal responses to government initiatives and informal avenues to
the Home Office are fairly well received (interview, Home Office) and the CBI has
positioned itself well to influence governmental deliberations. It is also part of the
stakeholder panel of the Migration Advisory Committee, an academic expert body
convened by the Home Office. An added strength of the CBI is its internal ideational
consensus on the desirability in principle of economic migration and its vast
benefits, shared by all members, including small and medium-sized enterprises
(interview, CBI). Internal ideational cohesion is thus very strong.
Employer preferences in the UK are also influenced by the particularities and
exigencies of the respective variety of capitalism. Employers seek to recruit migrants
at both ends of the skills distribution scale.
4. Conclusion
European employer associations have rediscovered an appetite for labour migrants.
Governments are heeding calls for more liberalised approaches to managing eco-
nomic migration. But employers are selective in terms of the migrant profile they
seek to attract; their preferences are conditioned by the systems of political
economy they are embedded in. In the view of organised business, ideal migrants
should easily fit into existing production systems and complement production
strategies.
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Employers have become very interested in labour migration in the UK and
Germany. The main contention according to which employer preferences are con-
ditioned by production strategies inherent in different models of capitalism is
largely borne out by the empirical evidence.
British employers have become more actively concerned with labour migration
policy in the wake of perceived skill and labour shortages. Labour recruitment
focuses on both highly skilled and unskilled and both generalist and sector-specific
skills; partially out of a conviction that the UK is in global competition for the best
brains and partially due to perceived deficiencies in domestic training institutions
and possible synergies in this regard. Given that concerns over manpower shortages
also motivated employers, the recession commencing in 2008 has led to less vocal
employer demands. The CBI accepted the labour market access ban on Romanians
and Bulgarians in 2007, as there was ‘a sufficiently sized labour pool’ (interview,
CBI) already present and the gastronomy sector association even actively supported
this ban (interview, BHA; Caterersearch 2006a and 2006b), concerned about a
negative backlash in public opinion. Concerns over skill shortages especially in
engineering, IT and finance have resulted in sustained employer advocacy of
liberalisation. German employers, especially those in the manufacturing sector,
notably metal processing association Gesamtmetall, have been strongly supportive
of highly skilled migration, complementing a high-skill high value added produc-
tion strategy. There has also been consistent lobbying for the introduction of a
points-based system and generally a more liberalised approach to highly skilled
migration, both with sector-specific and generalist skills. By contrast there is no
interest whatsoever in low-skill migration. This stance has in no way been influ-
enced by the financial crisis and recession commencing in 2007.
This article bridges the gap between two bodies of literature. It brings together
concepts from both the comparative political economy and the migration litera-
tures, insists on the integration of migration studies into broader debates in the
political science literature to help generate ‘portable insights’ (Bleich 2008, 510)
and demonstrates the empirical applicability of concepts of comparative capitalisms
to a new domain. Expanding and modifying Freeman’s insights for the European
context, it argues that organised interest groups become active in very specific ways,
lobbying for more liberal approaches that suit the respective skills and production
strategy of the variety of capitalism they are embedded in. The article examines the
role of employer associations in setting out their interest positions regarding the
design of labour migration policy, an area in which considerable paradigmatic
change has been under way in Europe since the mid-1990s, yet which remains
somewhat under-explored. Future research should establish whether the frame-
work proposed here could be applied to employers in other CMEs and LMEs, as
seems highly likely. From Tallinn to Rome governments are designing schemes that
will facilitate the inflow of the ‘best brains’, yet employers insist that these brains
(or muscles) fit into and complement existing systems of political economy.
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Notes
1. The terms are derived from Deeg’s (2007) work, though he defines them slightly differently
from the present usage. I suggest broadening his term of supplementarity to encompass the
‘import of input factors’ (Herrmann 2009, 18) missing or underprovided due to the institutional
particularities of domestic institutions.
2. While the distinction between general and specific skills has been regarded as difficult to
operationalise (Busemeyer 2009) and is indeed somewhat stylised, a broad distinction illus-
trating differences between models of capitalism does appear to be feasible and helpful.
3. The framework used here could be extended and modified to cover the ‘mixed market
economies’ (MMEs), such as France and Italy, and ‘emerging market economies’ (EMEs), such
as Poland, using categories proposed in recent additions to the literature (Hancké et al. 2007).
Employers in such systems could be expected to advocate labour migration to reflect skills and
sectoral needs present, including CME-style ‘islands of excellence’ in MMEs, but also the
substantial low-skill components of the economies in these countries. EMEs are displaying a
combination of traits of both CMEs and LMEs and would thus generate ambiguous employer
demands, depending primarily on skill shortages. To the extent that the varieties of capitalism
framework can be applied outside Europe, the argument about employer preferences should
also apply to a non-European LME, such as the US.
4. See for example his articles in Frankfurter Rundschau (10 May 2000) and Allgemeines Deutsches
Sonntagsblatt (17 and 24 March 2000).
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